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Cake day: June 8th, 2026

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  • Pretty much every supermarket near me sells prepaid phones. And yes, they work exactly as you described. You buy minutes or data to add to your account, and then it sits in your account until you use it. Before the memory shortage price gouging BS, I could go get a burner phone for like $75 at my local Walmart or Target. No clue what they’d cost now, but they’re likely still pretty cheap as far as phones are concerned. The phones won’t have great hardware, but they’ll at least be able to run Android and can do all the things that modern smartphones can do… Albeit much slower than a flagship model.

    As far as privacy goes, that will largely depend on your local laws. Drug dealers have historically used prepaid phones to avoid being tracked, (buy a phone card with cash, so you never have to use a debit or credit card to pay,) so governments started passing Know Your Customer laws that require the phone companies to verify and log your ID (tying it to your prepaid phone number, the same way a regular phone bill is tied to you) before they can sell to you. That way when the cops subpoena the phone company to see who owns a specific phone number, the company can actually tell them.



  • I mean, would you want it to serve clients outside of your subnet? I guess maybe if you had something like a guest network. But I tend to take the “fuck it, you get basic service and nothing else” approach to things like guest networks.

    Isn’t it a potential security issue to have your pihole serve things on any subnet, because it allows an improperly configured firewall to stab at your pihole? I think you can specify any additional subnets it will serve in the settings somewhere. But IIRC, the default behavior is to intentionally drop traffic from unknown subnets. But that’s just off the top of my head.


  • I’m somewhere in the middle, because comments like yours actually reinforce my concerns. A reverse proxy isn’t really doing anything to make you more secure, unless you’re using it for some sort of access control. It hides which ports you’re using, and allows you to encrypt your traffic with TLS… But it doesn’t add any additional security to the services you are exposing.

    Maybe if you use it for access control, to add a secondary username/password to the services. But that breaks most legitimate things (apps, mostly) that try to reach the double-password-protected service. Because a user on a web browser may be able to type in two passwords, (one for the reverse proxy, and then one for the service itself) but an app will try to pass that info automatically using headers.

    Any vulnerabilities in the services will still become potential attack vectors. Anyone who remembers the Huntarr debacle will know exactly what I’m talking about, because a single service being vulnerable can do a lot of damage. Yes, containerization does a lot to help mitigate damage by excluding access to everything except what you give it. But it won’t completely stop things from going wrong.







  • Even on iOS, you can disable biometrics by entering the power/SOS menu. Just hold the lock button and volume down for like two seconds, and biometrics are now disabled until the passcode is entered.

    Worth noting that this doesn’t actually re-encrypt the device. The device boots in an encrypted state, and entering the passcode allows the phone to unencrypt itself to function. But disabling the biometrics doesn’t re-encrypt the device. You would need to reboot to accomplish that. But if you’re able to access the power menu, you’re probably able to hit the “Power Off” option too.

    I only make the distinction because cops have started imaging devices after confiscating them. If they manage to image your device while it’s unencrypted, they can take their time with whatever new exploit/bypass is discovered in the future. But if the device is encrypted when they image it, they’d only get an encrypted data blob and would need to actually break the encryption instead of being able to use a passcode bypass method.

    iOS actually has a hidden “reboot if inactive after a little while” feature, specifically to re-encrypt an idle device. Most users only encounter it when they wake up in the morning and have to enter their passcode. But the point is that cops usually process devices in batches, so it usually takes them at least a few hours to get to your device. So if the device has been idle for a while, it will quietly reboot to encrypt itself. This also helps protect against future passcode bypasses that may be discovered, because an attacker would only get the encrypted data blob if they bypass the code on an encrypted device.