

Genuinely, I had a look at the source code and I could not get your gist. How can you tell?
Full time smug prick


Genuinely, I had a look at the source code and I could not get your gist. How can you tell?


Curiously enough, for years and years the main criticism of GrapheneOS is that it only runs on Google Pixel phones. Finally, they announce they will work with another provider, Motorola. Some people proceed to simply forecast enshitification, spyware, and ads. I don’t think this is sane at all.


Hey, not two days ago someone said that connections between Peter Thiel and age verification was a “conspiracy theory”. Apart from the above link, the article states:
And as these mandates create a captive market worth billions of dollars, a whole ecosystem of venture-backed “identity-as-a-service” startups has sprung up to serve it. Persona, valued at $2 billion and backed by Peter Thiel’s investment network, is just one of many.
Unrelated to the above, but I like the wording too much:
“Child safety” has simply become the marketing department for a rent-seeking surveillance industry.
Is this an US-only thing? There are several articles over the past few months hinting at US Big-Tech lobbying efforts in the EU. Thiel makes a living as a contractor of the surveillance apparatus. It is only in his interest to expand his business in the highly regulated EU, and I have not even started on his Dark Enlightment politics.
von der Leyen has no spine in this, if she isn’t actively complicit.


Let’s say this is the official narrative. My argument:
Conclusion: There is sufficient basis to consider that the official narrative is not the whole story.


They’ve already decided so. It is all in Project 2025: queerness and sex-ed are considered pornographic. And platforms have been preemptively demonetizing and censoring info for similar topics (abortion and sex-workers resources also) for years.


This is a cool way to protect a belief, narrowing the scope so that the refuting data do not apply anymore. Perhaps I can write a fucking essay about it, but do you have data to support this narrowing move? There is like a ton of data that the West has been invasively spying of possible threats to the status quo (from Cointelpro to undercover UK cops like recently), not just people “acting on it”. Furthermore, actions can fall under protected free speech as well, like putting up a poster, demonstrating, and protesting. So your proposal is inherently undemocratic if you roll back freedom to only protect oral expression, quite similar to a “Don’t ask don’t tell” attitude towards gay people. What you just said is simply counter-factual. Blanket surveillance is a staple of Western societies in the 21st century, and it blows my mind that there are still people oblivious to what is more or less spelled out clearly in the Patriot Act and all laws modeled after it across the globe.


There is a conceptual distinction: Encryption in transit vs. encryption at rest. You may send the packets encrypted to the server, but if they are not encrypted on the server’s file system, anyone can read them.
The real question is, why do you think governments make such a big fuss about citizens having access to military grade encryption?
There have been audits of e2ee implementations, and the algorithms used also have some objective properties. I don’t think that I have ever heard in cryptography discussions that backdoors are so widespread that the discussion is moot. I have only heard, time and time again, the opposite.
Even Apple, in this very occasion, opted to ditch the service rather than backdoor it, and in fact takes the UK to court over this. I think that the opinion that this is all for show is a tad wild, and not very well supported in this occasion.
Like every cryptology book starts with the adage “There is cryptography that prevents your little sister from reading your mail, and cryptography that prevents the government from reading your mail, and we will talk about the latter.”
On the other hand, not all implementations are created equal. Telegram was recently under fire, and there is a lot of variance in e2ee implementations in XMPP clients, IIRC.


OK now that arstechnica has written about it, shills might stop nagging in the comments about my titling. LMAO


The basic way to do this is you respond to these three questions: What am I trying to protect? From whom? What are they able to do to get there?


Note just to be sure, Mull is a different thing than Mullvad. What you wrote makes sense for Mullvad, but I am not so sure if this is the case with Mull, the mobile app.


I don’t think we understand very well the threat model here. Are we talking about having a Mozilla account or the web engine itself. If you have an account they will probably start doing mining shit with it. What about activists researching certain topics then? The content browsed can be visible to Mozilla if they use their account for syncing bookmarks. That should be a dealbreaker right there. No different than Meta user-profiling the fuck out of your engagement behaviors. Now if this is NOT the case and you haven’t a Mozilla account, I assume that the version of the web engine available back at the time of the fork is exactly the same. So far so good.
The problem is that browsers are hard, and there is a ton of web protocols to be implemented, various fixes for security, support extensions and other QOL features. WORD ON THE STREET is that tasks like these cannot be undertaken as solo/hobby projects, that funding and an organization structure is essential. The teams behind LibreWolf, Waterfox, etc have a track record of already lagging behind Firefox’s version updates. Same goes with user-profile and configuration sets like Arkenfox (if I am not wrong). You may tweak the conf all you want, but if privacy and anonymity is compromised at the web engine level, these forks will be left with little to do about it. Then the only option will be to keep using an old version of the web engine (sacrificing security and quality of life extensions), or ditching the gecko web engine altogether.
That is why people are looking for genuine alternatives to the web engine.


I thought Mullvad was the best in anti-fingerprinting. Anyone can check their own configuration with EFF’s “cover your tracks” site.


Perhaps this explains why all these spook impostors are so vehemently against advanced privacy and anonymity. They are signaling they are the good ones!


You write a wall if text thinking you will shift the views of disgusted people turning their back to the product, a product at that which was iconic for their open source culture, and yet it somehow managed to alienate the niche that was more favorable to it. Good luck with that!


This is trolling. It is beyond self-evident that the Open Source fediverse has thoroughly criticized the latest Mozilla move. I myself point out device fingerprinting and third party vendors. You respond to neither approach. You want me to do homework and quantify the sentiment on the trending Mozillla hashtag? Sealioning. Diigressing the topic of conversation? Report and block you sad impotent spook troll.


Your mastodon feed might be different that mine, lmao


This is some Gestapo/Stasi shit.
Like, all queer persons must go beyond Signal/Tor level.
This extends to the physical world: Plan ahead for escape routes and survival networks.
I will come back with this angle but, REMEMBER those mfers who always said “the NSA does not target you, so asking about anything more than Signal is paranoid/futile if ever the NSA targets you”?
REMEMBER that we said that some people have advanced threat models by default? Eg feminist activists, activists in third countries, queer people?
WHO is paranoid now, that being queer, pro-Palestine, and/or climate activists can have you on the watchlist?


They don’t even cite the datapoints, my friend. It is a trademark infringement cease-and-desist…


either Signal fans have to donate more or Signal has to start finding other monetization which if we look at other companies means selling private data.
Lo and behold, after RiseUp now Signal is accused of selling data. Well, it is well known (and audited) that Signal keeps so little metadata it is not even useful to the authorities that have subpoeana-ed it.
This is an extra-ordinary claim you have to back with extra-ordinary evidence, in order to save face.
The ambitiousness and “in-your-face” qualities of this project are to my liking. On the other hand, I can’t see serious applications.
Identity documents are mostly based on the trust projected on the issuing authority. The current approach is to seek alternatives with blockchains, commonly called digital identity. The EU is currently seeking a similar solution, with a sovereign blockchain infrastructure called EBSI.
Of course this does not solve most of the real and serious problems with identity documents. People without formal identification is an ongoing crisis in many countries. The author also makes good points about abusive parents one might want to disassociate from. But issuing your own identity does not solve these problems.
The key difference is the web of trust implied in each case. State entities trust other state entities about these documents, and they can use their infrastructure to tokenize this trust. It was never about the document itself.
But building an alternative web of trust? This goes solidly into crypto territory, and it will never catch up due to the connotations. Now, if the issuing authority was a federation of worker councils, that would be a different story.